

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

JONATHAN STEWART RODEN,

Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 2:09-cv-120
HON. R. ALLAN EDGAR

CATHY BAUMAN,

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Jonathan Stewart Roden filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of his state court convictions. Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery on July 10, 2000, and was sentenced to 10 to 50 years imprisonment. Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied on February 28, 2001. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed a motion to correct his sentence in the Berrien County Circuit Court on December 17, 2002, which was denied on January 3, 2004. On June 27, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the Berrien County Circuit Court, which was denied on August 20, 2007. Petitioner filed an appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied on January 31, 2008. Petitioner's subsequent appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was denied on September 9, 2008.

Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the

petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”

Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; *see Allen v Perini*, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 400 U.S. 906 (1970) (district court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be dismissed with prejudice.

In the opinion of the undersigned, Petitioner’s application is barred by the one-year period of limitation provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), which was enacted on April 24, 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act , PUB. L. No. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA). Section 2244(d)(1) provides:

- (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–
 - (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
 - (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
 - (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
 - (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The running of the period of limitation is tolled when “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

In this case, § 2244(d)(1)(A) provides the period of limitation. The other subsections do not apply to the grounds that Petitioner has raised. Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year limitation period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” According to Petitioner’s application, his direct appeal was denied by the Michigan Court of Appeals on February 28, 2001. Petitioner did not file an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. Petitioner did not take any further action until he filed his motion to correct sentence on December 17, 2002, several months after the statute of limitations had run.

While 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that the one-year statute of limitations is tolled while a duly filed petition for state collateral review is pending, the tolling provision does not “revive” the limitations period (i.e., restart the clock); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitations. Because Petitioner’s one-year period expired on February 28, 2001, his motion to correct sentence filed on December 17, 2002, did not serve to revive the limitations period. *See Vroman v. Brigano*, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003); *Thomas v. Johnson*, No. 99-3628, 2000 WL 553948, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2000); *Webster v. Moore*, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000); *see also Rashid v. Khulmann*, 991 F. Supp 254, 259 (S.D. N.Y. 1998); *Whitehead v. Ramirez-Palmer*, No. C 98-3433 VRW PR, 1999 WL 51793, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1999).

Petitioner has filed a motion for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations to allow his claims to proceed. The one-year limitation period applicable to § 2254 is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling. *Dunlap v. United States*, 250 F.3d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 2001). A petitioner bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to equitable tolling. *See Allen v. Yukins*, 366 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 543 U.S. 865 (2004); *Jurado v. Burt*, 337 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2003); *Griffin v. Rogers*, 308 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly cautioned that equitable tolling should be applied “sparingly” by this Court. *See Jurado*, 337 F.3d at 642; *Cook v. Stegall*, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2002); *Dunlap*, 250 F.3d at 1008-1009. In *Pace v. DiGuglielmo*, 544 U.S. 408, 418-19 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a petitioner seeking equitable tolling of the habeas statute of limitations has the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” *Id.* at 418 (applying standard set forth in *Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs*, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).

In his motion (docket #3), Petitioner states that he missed his deadline because he was ignorant of the one-year statute of limitations. However, the fact that Petitioner is untrained in the law, was proceeding without a lawyer, or may have been unaware of the statute of limitations for a certain period does not warrant tolling. *See Brown v. United States*, 2001 WL 1136000, *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2001) (unpublished case citing *United States v. Baker*, 197 F.3d 211, 218-19 (6th Cir. 1999) for proposition that ignorance of the law does not justify tolling); *Fisher v. Johnson*, 174 F.3d 710, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1999) (“ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse [late] filing.”); *Holloway v. Jones*, 166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (lack of professional legal assistance does not justify tolling); *Sperling v. White*, 30 F.Supp.2d

1246, 1254 (C.D. Cal.1998) (citing cases establishing that ignorance of the law, illiteracy, and lack of legal assistance do not justify tolling).

In his brief in support of the motion for equitable tolling, Petitioner states that he was prejudiced when his December 17, 2002, motion for correction in the judgment of sentence was improperly renamed as a “motion for relief from judgment” by the state court. However, as noted above, the statute of limitations had already run by the time Petitioner filed this motion. The undersigned fails to see how Petitioner was prejudiced with regard to the statute of limitations by this action. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s motion for equitable tolling (docket #3) be denied.

In summary, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and therefore recommends that this Court dismiss the petition with prejudice.

The Court of Appeals has suggested that a habeas petitioner is entitled to notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard before dismissal of his petition on statute of limitations grounds. *See Scott v. Collins*, 286 F.3d 923, 930 (6th Cir. 2002). This report and recommendation shall serve as notice that the District Court may dismiss Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief as time-barred. Furthermore, Petitioner’s ability to file objections to this report and recommendation constitutes his opportunity to be heard by the District Judge.

In addition, if Petitioner should choose to appeal this action, I recommend that a certificate of appealability be denied as to each issue raised by Petitioner in this application for habeas corpus relief. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a

“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A dismissal of Petitioner’s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, if the court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. *See Love v. Butler*, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is “somewhat anomalous” for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); *Hendricks v. Vasquez*, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); *Dory v. Commissioner of Correction of the State of New York*, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was “intrinsically contradictory” to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); *Williams v. Kullman*, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. *Murphy v. Ohio*, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is warranted. *Id.* Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). *Murphy v. Ohio*, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001). Consequently, the undersigned has examined each of Petitioner’s claims under the *Slack* standard.

The undersigned recommends that the court deny Petitioner’s application on procedural grounds that it is barred by the statute of limitations. Under *Slack*, 529 U.S. at 484, when a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only “when

the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Both showings must be made to warrant the grant of a certificate. *Id.* The undersigned concludes that reasonable jurists could not debate that each of Petitioner’s claims are properly dismissed on the procedural grounds that it is barred by the statute of limitations. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” *Id.* Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the court deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within ten (10) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. *United States v. Walters*, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

/s/ Timothy P. Greeley

TIMOTHY P. GREELEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: August 5, 2009